By Clifford L. Powers
There has lately been a lot of coverage on the impact of the justice system and sentencing juvenile defendants. Fueled by this, but much less talked about, is a movement to redefine the line between juvenile and adult, and to transform how our youth are treated by the system. Essentially to stop the practice of “lock ’em up and throw away the key”.
In this series of posts, I’m going to give a bit of history and try to explain what’s been done, what’s being done, and what needs to be done.
The first major decision came in 2005 when the United States Supreme Court (SCOTUS) decided Roper v. Simmons [1], holding that a person can’t be sentenced to death for crimes committed when they were a juvenile (under 18). The second came in 2010 when SCOTUS ruled in Graham v. Florida [2] that a sentence of life without parole [3] (i.e., you die in prison) is effectively a death sentence.
The Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which prohibits cruel and unusual punishment, the Court found, forbids such a sentence for juveniles who haven’t committed homicide. While states aren’t required to release a juvenile during their natural life, they are forbidden “from making the judgement at the outset that those offenders never will be fit to reenter society”. A juvenile must have the opportunity at some point to be released on parole.
These decisions established the two lines of precedent that led to Miller v. Alabama (2012) [4]. Here SCOTUS considered the consolidated appeals of two juveniles; one from Arkansas, the other for Alabama; who had received a mandatory natural life sentence for murder. In these cases, like so many, the sentencing judge had no discretion to give a lesser sentence. In a ruling that is still reverberating through the justice system, the Court said that any mandatory life-without-parole sentence for a juvenile violates the Eighth Amendment.
As the Court explained: “The sentencing schemes at issue were flawed because they treated every child as an adult. Mandatory life without parole for a juvenile precludes consideration of his chronological age and its hallmark features-among them, immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences. It prevents taking into account the family and home environment that surrounds them-and from which he cannot usually extricate himself-no matter how brutal or dysfunctional. It neglects the circumstances of the homicide offense, including the extent of his participation in the conduct and the way the familial and peer pressures may have affected him. Indeed, it ignores that he might have been charged and convicted of a lesser offense if not for incompetencies associated with you-for example, his inability to deal with police officers or prosecutors (including on a plea agreement) or his capacity to assist his own attorneys…. And finally, this mandatory punishment disregards the possibility of rehabilitation even where he circumstances most suggest it”.
The Miller Court made two main points: 1) That “children are constitutionally different from adults for purposes of sentencing”, and 2) that “youth matters in determining the appropriateness of a lifetime of incarceration without the possibility of parole”.
The Court’s decisions in these foundational cases were greatly influenced by a still-developing understanding of child and young adult brain development and psychology. The subsequent decisions across the country have likewise been driven by this.
The Two Millers and Illinois
Long before Miller v. Alabama, the Illinois Supreme Court (ISC) came to a similar conclusion in People v. Leo Miller [5] in 2002. Leon Miller was 15 years old when he was charged with being an accomplice to a multiple-murder. After being convicted, he was given a mandatory natural life without parole sentence. The ISC ruled that this violated the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution due to his age and level of involvement.
Commenting on its decision, the Court asserted that it was “consistent with the longstanding distinction made in [Illiois] between adult and juvenile offenders, a distinction underscored by the reality that our state was the first to create a court system dedicated exclusively to juveniles…. Illinois led the nation with our policy towards the treatment of juveniles in first forming the juvenile court, and, traditionally, as a society we have recognized that young defendants have a greater rehabilitative potential”.
Miller v. Alabama left open the question of how this monumental ruling was to be applied. The ISC decided People v. Davis [6] in 2014, holding that Miller should be applied retroactively as well as prospectively, meaning to anyone who meets the criteria (i.e., they were a juvenile when the crime was committed and received a mandatory natural life sentence) could petition the court to be resentenced. In 2016, SCOTUS made the same ruling in Montgomery v. Louisiana [7].
While the Miller Ruling seems straight-forward, its real implications and applications are still highly disputed over seven years later. Very important questions are being explored, debated, and answered between and within states. Here in Illinois, our Supreme Court has provided a few answers pro tempore in the past few years.
In People v. Reyes (2016)[8], the ISC held that the defendant’s mandatory minimum 97-year sentence was in contradiction with Miller, thereby extending SCOTUS’s ruling to mandatory de facto life sentences (and aggregate ones). Reyes had been convicted of several charges and sentenced to the minimum on each one. However, because each sentence was to be served consecutively, Reyes would end up spending the rest of his life in prison.
Then, in People v. Holman (2017)[9], the Court held that Miller also applies to discretionary natural life sentences. This actually went beyond the core holding in Miller but was rather based on the rationale followed and concerns how the Miller factors are to be considered and dealt with. (Something I will get into in Part II of this series).
Finally, in People v. Buffer (2019)[10], decided earlier this year, the ISC answered an essential question it had left open in its Reyes decision; i.e., what constitutes a de facto life sentence for Miller purposes? The answer is 41 years.
As we bring new issues to the courts and the State continues to seek exceptions to the rule, this law will keep evolving.
Young Adults
Parallel to the changes I mentioned above, one Illinois court has been leading the charge in developing a new jurisprudence regarding adolescents, or young adults. (These terms apply to the age ranges of 18-20 or 18-25, depending on where you look.) It was in People v. Thompson (2015)[11], involving a 19-year-old, that the ISC first acknowledged that the scientific studies on juvenile maturity and brain development may also apply to young adults, which in turn would warrant a Miller- and Leon Miller- type review. At this time, there were similar studies in young adults but they were new and few; this area of scientific inquiry is still coming into its own.
Although the Court at that time did not extend the Miller holding to young adults, noting that before such a ruling can be made “it is paramount that the record be sufficiently developed” regarding how the “‘evolving science’ on juvenile maturity and brain development” applies to the defendant, it did open the door for the claim to be raised. Thompson failed to do this in his initial petition to the circuit court; however, in December of 2018, he was given permission to refile.
That same year, in People v. House (2015)[12], the same appellate court vacated the mandatory natural life sentence of a 19-year-old convicted of a double-murder under a theory of accountability. Guided by Leon Miller and Miller, the Court found that due to House’s age and level of involvement (he was present at the kidnapping and acted as lookout during the murders, following orders from higher-ranking gang members) his sentence violated the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution.
The court did not find that House’s sentence violated the Eighth Amendment, and this is an important distinction. Miller addressed the sentence of a juvenile and as far as the First District Appellate Court has applied Miller’s rationale to young adults, no Illinois court has even entertained the idea of extending Miller’s Eighth Amendment holding.
In 2016, the same appellate court decided in People v. Harris [13] that his 76-year sentence violated the proportionate penalties clause as well. Like Reyes (see above), Harris received the minimum on both of his charges (20 years plus a 25-year gun enhancement for murder, and 6 years plus a 25-year gun enhancement for attempted murder) to be served consecutively. Harris was 18 when the crime was committed, but unlike House, he was the only one involved.
While the circumstances were different, the court found the rationale in House instructive: “All sentencing cases are fact-specific, but Harris is similar to House in some important ways. Like House, Harris was young… when he committed his crimes. Like House, Harris had no violent criminal history…. Harris’s responsibility for his crimes was much greater than House’s, but Harris has additional attributes for arguing for his rehabilitative potential. Harris had grown up in a stable family environment, and those family members continued to support him through his sentencing. Harris was finishing high school when he committed the murders and completed his GED while in pre-trial custody…. that evidence… does support the notion that Harris might be able to rehabilitate himself if given the opportunity. Or, in the words of our constitution, might be able to restore himself to ‘useful citizenship’.”
Unfortunately, in late 2018 the ISC overturned the appellate court’s ruling in Harris for failing to properly develop the evidentiary record, as they had done in Thompson (see above). The same day, the Court overturned House as well and ordered the appellate court to reconsider its decision in light of Harris. Harris has since been given permission to refile the claim in the circuit court, and the appellate court reaffirmed its decision in House. What happens next remains to be seen.
More and more of us who were convicted for crimes committed as young adults and given life sentences (myself at 18) are bringing this claim to court. The movement is gaining steam and even the Legislature is coming to recognize that people who committed crimes as children and young adults deserve a chance at life. (See my article “Illinois Enacts Youthful Parole for Some” at http://www.criminallegalnews.org). But it will take the concern, compassion, and support of everyone to make the changes happen.
Please check back next month for an in-depth look at these issues in Part II.
Notes
- Roper v. Simon, 543 U.S. 551 (2005)
- Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48(2010)
- Life Without the Possibility of Parole is an official sentence, usually reserved for the worst crimes or for those with exceptional criminal records. It means exactly what it says, you remain in prison for life.
- Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012)
- People v. Miller, 202 Ill. 2d 328 (Ill. 2002)
- People v. Davis, 2014 IL 115595
- Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718
- People v. Reyes, 2016 IL 119271
- People v. Holman, 2017 IL 120655
- People v. Buffer, 2019 IL 122327
- People v. Thompson, 2015 IL 11815
- People v. House, 2015 IL App (1st) 11580 (and 2019 IL App (1st) 11580-B)
- People v. Harris, 2016 IL App (1st) 141744 (and 2018 IL 121932)
Iconoclast Heroes 